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Understanding China’s historical development: The profit and the 




The purpose of this paper is to describe China’s unique historical 
development that transformed the Celestial Empire into the largest 
economy in the world in the beginning of the nineteenth century, with a 
GDP that exceeded that of Western Europe, Japan, the US and Russia 
combined, and the decline during the ‘Century of Humiliation’, and Mao 
Zedong’s communism that culminated in the ‘Three Bitter Years’ from 1958 
to 1961 that produced the large famine with an estimated death of 20 to 30 
million people. After this disaster, aggravated by the ‘Cultural Revolution’ 
that followed, came the amazing growth started by Deng Xiaoping’s 
economic reforms in 1978, that is only comparable to the United States 
emergence as an economic giant during the nineteenth century. China’s 
sustained growth, at an astounding 10 percent per year over the last 30 
years, is without precedent. Many economists predict this growth rate will 
continue at 7 to 8 percent per year for several decades. This extraordinary 
sustained growth was partially fueled by the formation of its rapidly 
expanding financial market, and the profit and risks that its stock marked 
provides investors. 
 
Keywords: China’s historical development, China’s social-capitalism, 
China’s economic growth, Risks to China’s growth, China’s remaining 
poverty, China’s bureaucracy and corruption, China’s stock market, China’s 
mutual funds China’s unsustainable growth 5 
    
China’s stunning growth 
In the past thirty years, China has transformed itself from an 
economical and technological backward nation into one of the world’s most 
dynamic economies. It has opened its doors to new ideas and techniques, 
introduced competition to all aspects of production, strengthened its 
commitment to widespread education, and taken advantage of the 
opportunities offered by its World Trade Organization (WTO) membership. 
In December 2001, China officially joined the WTO. The results have been 
dramatic for both China and the United States (US). From 2001 to 2005 the 
US exports to China rose from United States Dollars (USD) 19 billion to 41.8 
billion and imports from China rose from USD 102 billion to 243.5 billion 
(Malkiel and Taylor, 2008, p. 51). The Chinese are now the third trading 
nation in the world behind only of the US and Germany. 
The Chinese have one of the highest savings rates in the world, around 
50 percent of the Gross National Product (GDP), that contrast sharply with 
the United States were the saving rate is essentially zero. In other words, 
the Chinese save more than they spend. People in the United States do 
exactly the opposite. As a consequence the Chinese economy is awash in 
capital from savings looking for investment opportunities. This capital has 
been used for modernizing production, which in turn has increased 
profitability, and generated more capital. The government also took 
advantage of the abundance of capital to improve the country’s 
infrastructure that in turn fuels economic growth. China now has the only 
commercially operated Maglev train in the world. The train operates in 
Shanghai between the city and the airport at speeds up to 260 miles per 
hour using magnets to elevate it above the track. 
Some impressive statistics illustrate the recent success of the Chinese 
economy. China has been the fastest-growing major nation for the past 
quarter of a century with an average GDP growth rate above 10%. Its per 
capita income (GDP per head) has grown at an average annual rate of more 
than 8% over the last three decades drastically reducing poverty, but this 
rapid growth has been accompanied by rising income inequality. As a result 
China is now the second largest economy in the world after the US with a 6 
    
GDP of USD 7.8 trillion in 2008 when measured on purchasing power parity 
(PPP) basis. It is the third largest after the US and Japan with a nominal 
GDP of USD 4.4 trillion in 2008 when measured in exchange-rate terms, 
overtaking Germany in 2008 according to the International Monetary Fund 
(April 2009). The Chinese foreign exchange reserve is now around USD 1.3 
trillion, and China is the largest investor in US treasury bonds. According to 
some estimates 80% of the Chinese foreign exchange reserve is in USD. 
In the modern era, China's influence in the world economy was 
minimal until the late 1980s. At that time, economic reforms started in 
1978 began to generate significant and steady growth in investment, 
consumption and standards of living. China now participates extensively in 
the world market, and its private companies, like Lenovo, started to play a 
major role in the world economy. China has become the world’s second 
largest consumer of luxury goods surpassing in 2008 the US and second 
only to Japan. The demand for luxury items in China is growing at the 
fantastic rate of 20% annually. China has an estimated 18 thousand 
billionaires, 440 thousand millionaires, and a fast rising middle class of 
around 250 million who have high purchasing power and are eager to spend 
in luxury goods (Morisset and Lee 2008). China now has 170 cities with 
more than 1 million habitants compared to the US that has only 10 such 
cities. There are over 400 million Chinese subscribers to wireless phone 
services that represent 100 million more that the entire population of the 
US (Malkiel and Taylor, 2008, p. 44). 
 
China’s history 
It is important to review China’s history to get a background 
understanding of the unique hybrid economy that it has constructed in the 
last three decades. This unique construct has its dangers for investors that 
we will present in the section we discuss the perceived risks of the Chinese 
economic model. For simplicity’s sake, we can divide China’s history into 
eight major periods: Warring feudal states, Celestial Empire and 
Confucianism, Colonialism and a Century of Humiliation, Westernization 7 
    
movement, Bourgeois Revolution, Mao’s communism, Cultural Revolution, 
and Deng Xiaoping’s social-capitalism. 
 
Warring feudal states 
Before China was unified by the emperor Qin Shi Huang (259-210 BC) 
in 221 BC the country was divided into dozens of viciously warring feudal 
states. This period is illustrated by the impressive displays of the constant 
wars between the feudal states in China’s National Museum in Beijing. In 
this turmoil, arose the man that with his philosophy had the greatest 
influence on China’ future cultural development: Confucius (551-479 BC). 
Through conceived out of wedlock and raised in poverty, Confucius 
managed to become an accountant in the state of Lu and eventually was 
named its justice Minister. Disgusted with the brutality and greed 
surrounding him, he resigned from his post and began a long journey 
around China, lobbing unsuccessfully many different rulers for political 
reform. After twelve years, he returned home and spends the last year of 
his life teaching a large number of students, and writing and editing a set of 
Chinese classics (Malkiel and Taylor, 2008, p. 16), including the ‘Book of 
Odes’, ‘Book of History’, ‘Book of Rites’, ‘Book of Changes’, ‘Book of Music’ 
and the ‘Spring and Autumn Annuals’. Confucius own statements were 
compiled into a book entitled ‘The Analects’ by his disciples. Of these, only 
the ‘Book of Music’ was lost. 
The period from 722 to 221 BC was a golden age for ancient Chinese 
history. In this period various schools of thought emerged and contended, 
including the Confucian school. It was also in this period that the scholar-
bureaucrat class emerged as the elite class, a position it maintained for 
more than 2 thousand years. An interesting example of this period is the 
Jixia Academy of the State of Qi that attracted representatives of the 
various schools of thought. The Duke Xuan (375-358 BC) of Qi was an 
enlightened ruler providing board and lodging, as well as government 
subsidies for experts and scholars coming to give lectures, and never 
inquiring about their backgrounds. This was an era when “one hundred 
schools of thought contended and a hundred flowers blossomed.” The 8 
    
scholars debated in forums, wrote books to expound their doctrines, and 
left behind many splendid classic works of scholarship. 
 
Celestial Empire and Confucianism 
Unfortunately, when Qin Shi Huang ruled as the First Emperor of 
unified China from 221 to 210 BC, his Prime Minister Li Si ordered that all 
books except those on medicine, fortune telling and tree planting be 
burned. So, all the classics of the various schools of thought were 
destroyed. Emperor Wu Di (156-87 BC) of the Western Han Dynasty that 
defeated the Qin dynasty in 207 BC made Confucianism the orthodox 
doctrine of the state, while other schools of thought were deemed heretical. 
He set up an educational system of training the future official with 
Confucian classics. These scholar-bureaucrats helped the emperor organize 
the society according to the doctrine of Confucianism and manage the 
country with the thoughts and philosophy of Confucianism. The magnificent 
Han dynasty oversaw a powerful and unified great empire. Relying on its 
military strength and brilliant culture it dominated the east as the Roman 
Empire dominated the west. The capital was in Chang’an, it was called 
Western Han to distinguish it from East Han, which was established later 
and took Luoyang as the capital. 
During the Sui Dynasty (581-618) was established the Ke Ju, the 
national examination system for selecting talented young people to be 
scholar-bureaucrats and thus make their contribution to the management of 
the country. The system allowed talented young people to change their 
social position through their personal efforts. This national examination 
system is still the main approach of the Chinese education system today in 
selecting young talent. 
   The natural creativity and ingenuity of the Chinese people flourished, 
with the result that they developed porcelain, gunpowder, the wheelbarrow, 
the compass, the stirrup, the spinning wheel, and the paper. And yet China 
never seemed to capitalize on these discoveries, despite the fact that that it 
is reputed to have the highest gross national products in the world by the 
seventeenth century. At the time, when Great Britain was laying the 9 
    
groundwork for European industrial revolution, there was a stillness and 
immobility within China (Malkiel and Taylor, 2008, p. 19). The Celestial 
Empire saw itself as the world’s premier entity in size, population, age and 
experience, untouchable in its cultural achievements and sense of moral, 
spiritual, and intellectual superiority. The Chinese lived, they thought, at the 
center of the universe. The Chinese emperor was the “Son of Heaven.” 
Those who represented him and administered for him, the scholar-
bureaucrats, were chosen by the competitive national examination system 
in their proficiency in Confucian letters and morals. They embodied the 
highest Chinese culture, its prestige, its wholeness and sublimity. Such 
cultural triumphalism combined with petty downward tyranny made China a 
reluctant improver and a bad learner (Landes, 1998, p. 335-336). 
The peace and serenity of Confucius’s teaching, a powerful centralized 
government, and a perfected and rigorous civil service examination system 
in which anyone could participate, no matter how humble his social 
background created a monolithic society that dampened competition and 
scientific advancement. Education became viewed as the path to 
advancement in civil service rather than an instrument for encouraging free 
inquiry and the consequent development of science and technology. The 
best and the brightest opted and were selected into government services, 
and shunned going into commerce. This because in the Confucian ranking 
the scholar-bureaucrats are at the top, followed by the farmers, the 
artisans, and, last of all, the despised merchants. In China, the road to 
social status and riches led to government employment where the term 
“kowtowing” was coined. By contrast, in Europe commerce and 
mercantilism opened a unique path to riches, where creativity and daring 
were the ‘sine qua non’ of success. 
Despite all this, and its rigid bureaucracy and complacency, China was 
the largest economy in the world at the beginning of the nineteenth 
century. Its GDP was roughly a third of the world output. Indeed, China’s 
output exceeded that of Western Europe, Japan, the US, and Russia 
combined. Because of its self-sustained wealth, strong government, and 
insularity, the country’s ruling classes became imbued with a feeling of 
superiority and a conviction that there was no need to pay attention to what 10 
    
was going on elsewhere. Thus China was totally ignorant of the enormous 
change occurring in Europe as a result of the industrial revolution (Malkiel 
and Taylor, 2008, p. 21). 
 
Colonialism and a Century of Humiliation 
During the eighteenth century Europe was embracing technology and 
new production methods. In particularly Great Britain with its rapid increase 
in production efficiency, needed to expand into overseas markets. In 1792, 
Britain send an envoy, George McCartney, to see Emperor Qianlong (1711-
1799) of the Qing Dynasty (1644-1912) to improve the terms of trade in 
with China and to open up trading posts in coastal cities. The proposal from 
the rapidly rising British Empire met with no interest, and the Imperial Qing 
Court prepared an edict stating that China with it vast resources had no 
need for any goods that the British could provide. Lord McCartney was 
dismissed and told to leave China immediately. The Imperial Qing Court 
gave further orders to all governors not to allow the British to carry out 
trade or business, aside from the sole approved trading post for Europeans 
in the southern city of Guangzhou (Malkiel and Taylor, 2008, p. 22-23). 
The allowed limited trade with the British of Chinese tea for silver 
continued and was highly profitable for all those involved. As trade 
flourished, a substantial amount of the world reserves of silver were flowing 
to China, and as a consequence the international price of silver increased. 
For this reason, the British started substituting the expensive silver for 
opium, a cheaper commodity grown on plantations in India under a British-
sanctioned monopoly that determined that the opium produced could only 
be sold in China. This new trade of tea for opium was extraordinary 
profitable for the British, but for the Chinese the results were calamitous, 
with thousands upon thousands of Chinese becoming addicted to the drug. 
The Imperial Qing court tried to curtail the trade of opium that was 
creating a widespread opium dependency and a substantial outflow of goods 
and money from China to purchase the drug. The British ignored these 
attempts and encouraged the sale of opium to China because of the high 
profits involved. Finally in 1838, Emperor Dao Guan (1782-1850) appointed 11 
    
Lin Zexu (1785-1850) as imperial commissioner to stop the trade of opium 
that was devastating local life and economy ordered a complete ban on 
opium. In early 1939, Lin Zexu arrived in Guangzhou and confiscated and 
burned 2 million pounds of opium on the Humen Beach in a large ceremony. 
The British traders upset by the heavy financial loss incurred lobbied their 
government for retaliation, and the First Opium War broke out. The British 
navy and marines invaded in 1840, under the command of George Elliot 
(1784-1863), China’s southern coast under the pretense of free trade and 
the protection of British citizens (Jin, 2003, p. 188). 
The Chinese with their outdated military technology were defeated by 
the British, and in 1842 the imperial envoys Qi Ying (1790-1858) and Yilibu 
(1772-1843) were forced to sign the ‘Treaty of Nanking’ with the British 
plenipotentiary Henry Pottinger (1789-1856) on a British warship anchored 
at Xiaguan, Nanjing. The treaty provided an indemnity of twenty-one million 
silver dollars, the cession of Hong Kong, and opening of five trading ports – 
Guangzhou, Xiamen, Fuzhou, Ningbo, and Shanghai. Besides this the treaty 
also estipulate that the traffic on export and import customs on British 
goods to be fixed by mutual agreement, and no intervention by the Imperial 
Court in opium trade. In the following year (1843) the ‘General Regulations’ 
and the ‘Supplementary Treaty of Hoomun Chai’ were signed giving the 
British the right to conduct trade, renting land and constructing houses at 
the five ports, and the unilateral most-favored-nation treatment in China. 
Such unequal treaties severely infringed on the sovereignty and territorial 
integrity of China (Jin, 2003, p. 189). 
To aggravate the Chinese humiliation, the American and the French 
hearing about the success of the British troops threatened to use military 
force to obtain similar concessions. Under this treat Qi Ying signed the 
‘Treaty of Wang-hea’ with the American envoy extraordinary and minister 
plenipotentiary Caleb Cushing (1800-1879), and the ‘Treaty of Whampoa’ 
with the French special envoy Marie Melchior Joseph de Lagrene (1800-
1862) giving both countries similar privileges as those given to the British. 
Not even this resounding defeat and humiliation changed the innate feeling 
of superiority of the Celestial Empire’s Court. They saw no reason to 
change, and innovation was not encouraged (Jin, 2003, p. 188). 12 
    
The decline and corruption of the Imperial Qing Court governing the 
country caused people to constantly stage uprisings across the country. The 
Taiping Rebellion started in 1851 by Hong Xiuquan (1814-1864) inspired by 
Christianity and the idea of one God as being the only true divine being, 
created the Heavenly Kingdom of Taiping, and in 1953 captured Nanjing 
and transformed it in its Capital (Yang, 2003, p. 191-192). Taking 
advantage of the situation, the British initiated in the spring of 1857 the 
Second Opium War using at as pretext the seizure in 1856 of a pirate vessel 
by the Chinese navy that was registered in Hong Kong. The French joined 
the British using as a pretext the killing of a French Catholic priest. The 
Anglo-French army marched into Peking in 1860, now on Beijing, burned 
down the Summer Palace with its large Easter art collection, and the 
Imperial Qing Court had no other way but to sign another unequal treaty 
the ‘Convention of Peking’, with Britain, France, America, and Russia. These 
treaties were followed by other countries, including Germany and Japan. 
The treaties established foreign concessions and military bases on Chinese 
territory (Jin, 2003, p. 189). From then on, the westerns powers spread out 




After the defeat in the Second Opium War the general believe emerged 
in China that in order to resist the invasion of the heated foreigners they 
had to buy foreign warships and cannon as well to learn to make machines 
and firearms. The Imperial Qing court therefore in the end of the nineteenth 
century started buying foreign arms, importing machines, recruiting foreign 
technicians, opening up mines and factories, employing foreign officials to 
train armed forces and sending students to study abroad to achieve China’s 
rejuvenation. This modernization movement was summarized by Zhan 
Zhidong (1837-1909) as “Chinese learning as the base, and Western 
learning for application” (Jin, 2003, p. 192). The modernization depended 
completely on foreign personnel, machinery, production technology, and 13 
    
raw materials, and the arms and warships produced by them were of very 
low quality. 
There was shortage of funds and the lack of support by basic industries 
made the Imperial Qing Court realize that the wealth and strength of the 
Western powers depended not only on advanced weaponry but also on 
economic power. Thus under the slogan of “striving for wealth” and 
“strength and prosperity is based on wealth”, they started setting up some 
civilian industries. At the beginning, most civilian industries were 
government-supervised and merchant-managed. Among them were the 
China Merchant Steamship Navigation Company, Kaiping Coal Mines, China 
Telegraph Office and Shanghai Textile Mill (Jin, 2003, p. 193). Over time, 
other enterprises were created with co-management by government and 
merchants and some entirely private industries. 
The closing of the nineteenth century saw also the Sino-French (1883-
1885) and the Sino-Japanese (1874-1895) Wars. The French captured 
Vietnam and the Japanese Taiwan, the islands under its jurisdiction, Penghu 
islands and Liaodong Peninsula. In both cases the Chinese were forced to 
sign treaties accepting these conquests under humiliating conditions. After 
the conclusion of the Sino-Japanese Wars in 1995, China felt the treat of 
being partitioned by colonizing nations (Jin, 2003, p. 194-195). 
Some of the missionaries that swarmed into China aroused successive 
rebellions since they took people’s farmlands, coerced government, 
monopolized legal practice, and incited scoundrels to ride roughshod over 
the people. The peasants began their struggles against these aggressions 
and Yi He Quan became an organization to support such struggles. This 
organization attracted people that were against foreigners and official 
corruption. These people were taught to practice boxing. In autumn of 
1898, the Catholics in Liyuan village of Guanxian County, Shandong 
destroyed the Yuquan Temple in order to build a Catholic church. The 
villagers called in the help of the Yi He Quan to protect the temple. The 
villagers then set fire to the Hongtaoyuan church and hoisted the flag 
“support the Qing to expel foreigners” in the Jiangjia village of Guanxian 
county. This started a rebellion that destroyed churches and attacked 14 
    
Catholics and drove away missionaries, and so won support of the populace. 
On the second half of 1899, the Yi He Quan and other similar organizations 
renamed themselves as Yi He Tuan, and by 1900 had spread all over the 
Beijing and it could even be found in the northeast, northwest and 
southwest regions of China. Empress Dowager Ci Xi (1825-1908) had a 
grudge against Japan and Western countries and supported the Yi He Tuan 
to destroy the foreigners (Jin, 2003, p. 198). This started what is commonly 
known as the ‘Boxer Rebellion’. 
The United States, Britain, France and Germany in April 1900 
presented a note to the Imperial Qing Court for it to suppress the Yi He 
Tuan movement in two months. In May all the foreign envoys in Beijing held 
a meeting and decided to send an allied force to suppress the Yi He Tuan. 
The army of over 2 thousand men organized by Britain, the United States, 
Germany, France, Russia, Japan, Italy and Austria send toward Beijing was 
defeated by the Yi He Tuan and the Qing Imperial Army. At the same time, 
allied warships attacked and occupied the Dagukou Fort. This decided 
Empress Dowager Ci Xi to declare war against foreign powers. As a 
consequence a large allied army burned and looted Beijing and Empress 
Dowager Ci Xi gave instructions to negotiate appease the allies. The allies 
that also had declared war on China – Britain, United States, Germany, 
France, Japan, Italy, Russia, Austria and those that declared war but did not 
send troops, like Spain, Belgium and Holland – presented an outline of  a 
peace agreement to the Imperial Qing Court. In 1901 the Imperial Qing 
Court signed the “International Protocol of 1901’ by witch it would pay an 
indemnity of 450 million that with interest amounted to 980 million teal of 
silver n, establish a ‘legation quarter’ where to be stationed, dismantled the 
fortresses along the way from Dagukou to Beijing, forbid Chinese troops to 
be stationed twenty li of Tianjin and allow foreign troops to the way from 
Beijing to Shanghai. This protocol turned China into a semi-colony under 
joint-jurisdiction of the foreign powers (Jin, 2003, p. 199). 15 
    
 
Bourgeois Revolution 
From the sixteenth century onward two totally different groups of 
foreigners successfully entered and influenced China. The first were the 
missionaries who began arriving in the sixteenth century. These 
missionaries, specially the Jesuits, in order to demonstrate the rightfulness 
of their beliefs sought to prove the superiority of their culture by introducing 
new forms of education and technology. Jesuits introduced and build clocks 
and other mechanical devices, translated and disseminated Western 
science, and even supervised the Imperial Bureau of Astronomy and 
foundries producing astronomical instruments and heavy artillery. The 
second influx of foreigners arrived in the eighteenth and nineteenth 
centuries. These came primarily to make money, looked down on the 
Chinese, did not learn the language, and clustered geographically in 
enclaves where their governments had obtained extraterritorial rights. While 
the Chinese resented the humiliation imposed by these foreigners, they 
were also impressed by their accomplishments and wealth. Shanghai, for 
example, was little more than a fishing village when the British took it as 
treaty port in 1842. Within five decades it was the largest commercial city in 
the Far East and trailed only London and New York as a financial center 
(Malkiel and Taylor, 2008, p. 25-26). 
The bourgeois movement against the Manchu Qing Dynasty was led by 
Sun Yat-seen (1866-1925), a medical doctor and political activist active in 
Guangzhou and Macao, that in 1894 established in Honolulu the Xing Zhong 
Hui (Society for the Revival of China). He proposed to “drive out the 
Manchu, restore China, and establish a united government”. He staged 
several uprisings that failed. In 1905 Sun Yat-seen amalgamated 
revolutionary groups in Tokyo to form the Zhongguo Tong Meng Hui 
(Chinese Revolutionary League) with the program to “drive out the 
Manchu’s, restore China, establish a republic and equalize landownership”. 
He was elected president of the league, set up an executive group with the 
head of Huang Xing (1874-1916), and created the Min Bao (People’s 
Journal). In the first issue of the Min Bao Sun Yat-sen put forward the ‘ 16 
    
Principle of Nationalism’ , the ‘ Principle of Democracy’ , and the ‘ Principle 
of the People Livelihood’, which called for the Chinese people to overthrow 
the Qing rule, and the establishment of an independent republic (Jin, 2003, 
p. 208). 
The Tong Meng Hui organized many armed uprisings. Local revolts 
gained momentum against taxation, robbery of rice, and the struggle for 
restoration of the rights of railways and mines held by foreigners. The 
insurrection finally was successful and defeated the Qing Imperial Troops 
and captured Wuchang City, and subsequently Hankau and Hanyang were 
also occupied. The victorious army declared the independence of the Hubei 
province.  Shortly afterwards many other provinces declared independence, 
and when Sun Yat-sen returned to China from abroad in December 1911, 
the provincial delegates convened in Nanjing and elected him Provisional 
President, and declared 1912 as the first year of the republic. On January 1, 
Sun Yat-sen took the office, and on February 12, the child Emperor Puyi 
(1906-1967) of the Qing Dynasty was forced to declare abdication, ending 
the Qing rule that lasted more than 2 thousand years. The revolution that 
created the Republic of China is called by historians the ‘Revolution of 
Xinhai’ because it occurred in the year Xinhai according to the Chinese 
calendar (Jin, 2003, p. 209-210). 
Based on the Tong Meng Hui (Chinese Revolutionary League), Sun Yat-
sen, Huang Xing, Song Jiaoren (1882-1813), and others established 
Kuomintang (the National People’s Party) in Beijing. Sun Yat-sen was made 
director, and Son Jiaoren was put in charge of the management of the 
party. In the national elections held in February 1913, the Kuomintang won 
the majority of seats and gained the right to organize the parliament. This 
upset Yuan Shikai (1859-1916) who had been the head of the Qing Dynasty 
Cabinet and had held its military power in its hand. He had Son Jiaoren 
assassinated; raised lots of money from the banks of Britain, France, 
Germany, Japan, and Russia send his troops to get rid of the 
revolutionaries. This forced the Kuomintang, under the leadership of Sun 
Yat-sen, launched the ‘Second Revolution with determination to suppress 
Yuan Shikai. These efforts were fruitless and Yuan Shikai ordered the 
Kuomintang to dissolve, suspended parliament, the provincial assemblies, 17 
    
abolished the ‘Provisional Constitution’, and reinstated the imperial system 
of government with himself as emperor in December 1915 (Jin, 2003, p. 
214-215). 
The restoration of the monarchy by Yuan Shikai aroused strong 
opposition and isolated by the majority, including his subordinates, he had 
to declare the end of the imperial system on March 1916, and he died 
shortly afterwards in June. After the death of Yuan Shikai, the Beijing 
government was under control of various Northern Warlords; some backed 
by foreign powers, and with led to constant transfer of regimes, political 
chaos, frequent wars, and great suffering of the people (Jin, 2003, p. 215). 
In 1922 the Kuomintang was reorganized in a conference in Shanghai, 
and in 1924 the First National Congress of Kuomintang was held in 
Guangzhou with the attendance of the Communist Party of China founded in 
Shanghai in 1921. At this congress, Sun Yat-sen’s tree ‘People’s Principles, 
namely nationalism, democracy and the peoples livelihood were explained 
in a new way, and the Central Executive Board of the Kuomintang was 
elected, which included the Communist Party. In 1926, with the purpose to 
unify China again, the ‘National Army’, under the command of Chiang Kai-
check (1887-1975), started the ‘Northern Expedition’ against the ‘Northern 
Warlords’. At around this time the Kuomintang started to disintegrate with 
the murder of Liao Zhongkai (1877-1925), the right hand of Sun Yat-sen 
who died of his illness the same year, the purging of party, and other 
incidents.  In 1927 Chiang Kai-check in Shanghai and Wang Jingwei (1883-
1944) in Wuhan simultaneously carried out reactionary coup d’états. The 
purging of the Kuomintang that followed marked the end of its cooperation 
with the Communist Party in China (Jin, 2003, p. 214-215). 
 
Mao’s communism 
In April of 1927, the Nanjing National Government was set up with 
Chiang Kai-check as its Chairman, and in July of the same year, the Wuhan 
National Government was created with Wang Jingwei as its head. The Ning 
of Nanjing and the Han from Wuhan confronted each other for legitimacy. 
In August of the same year, Chang Kai-check having suffered a defeat in 18 
    
‘Northern Expedition’, and pressed by the Wuhan Government, was forced 
to resign and move to Japan. In November of the same year, the Nanjing 
Government led by Li Zonggren (1891-1969) defeated Tang Shengzhi () 
who held Wuhan. In January 1928, Chiang Kai-check returned and resumed 
his post as commander-in-chief of the National Army and launched another 
‘Northern Expedition’ and defeated Zhang Zuolin (1875-1928) who held 
Beijing. The son of Zhang Zuolin, Zhang Xueliang (1901-2002), after his 
father’s death, under the treat of the Japanese, declared obedience to the 
Nanjing Government in which he was followed by the warlords of the 
southwest provinces. Thus the Kuomintang expanded its rule over the 
whole of China in 1928 (Jin, 2003, p. 224). 
The Communist Party did not accept the rule of the Nanjing 
Government, and in August 1927 Zhou Enlai (1898-1976) and others led 
the ‘Nanchang Uprising’ that was defeated. In September the ‘Autumn-
harvest Uprising with Mao Zedong (1893-1976) had to turn to the 
countryside due to heavy losses. The army then was reorganized, and the 
principle of the Communist Party leadership over the army as well as the 
Soldier Committee was established to administer the army in a democratic 
way. This new organization was the base for the ‘People’s Red Army’ that 
developed into a 60 thousand men strong army by 1931 extending their 
influence over 11 provinces. In November 1931, the First All-China Soviet 
Congress of the Soviet Chinese Republic was convened in Ruijin, Jaiangxi 
Province, and it proclaimed the Provisional Central Government of the 
Chinese Soviet Republic. From then on the Soviet red areas and the 
Kuomintang controlled white areas coexisted (Jin, 2003, p. 224-225). 
The Kuomintang Government carried out a series of economic and 
cultural reforms within their area. They took back the administrative power 
over the railways from foreigners, creating state-owned railways, increased 
the railways and roads, promoted the reform and unification of the 
currency, facilitated the recovery and development of the agriculture, 
industry and commerce. As a result, the Chinese economy increased and 
prospered. By contrast the Chinese Soviet Republic was a state of the 
workers and peasants’ dictatorship with the aim of demolishing all the 
feudal past, getting rid of the influence of foreign powers in China and 19 
    
unifying China. Mao Zedong was appointed Chairman of the Central 
Executive Committee, and Zhu De (1886-1976) the Chairman of the 
Revolutionary Military Committee. The Nanjing Government National Army 
led by Chiang Kai-shek launched four encirclement attempts of the Red 
Army on the central base area in Jiangxi without success. In the fifth 
attempt in October 1934, the Red Army was forced to retreat from Jiangxi, 
and started the epic ‘Long March’ that crossed more than ten provinces 
within two years and covered 25 thousand kilometers from south to north 
(Jin, 2003, p. 225-226). 
The Japanese that had received after the First World War the German 
concessions in Northeast China wanted more, and in 1931 invaded 
Manchuria, in 1932 sent troops into Shanghai and obtained further 
concessions in the city, and in 1937 set out to conquer the whole country. 
In December 1937 they occupied Nanjing, the capital of China at the time, 
and committed one of the most appalling atrocities of World War II with the 
objective to completely crush the Chinese will to fight. This objective was 
not met, and the invasion motivated the Kuomintang and the Communist 
Party, that had been engaged in a civil war, to join forces temporally. Due 
to their better equipment the Japanese troops prevailed, the Chinese army 
retreated everywhere, and half of the Chinese territory was occupied by the 
Japanese. The Chinese under both parties started a ‘War of Resistance’. 
With the defeat of the Japanese in September of 1945, Mao Zedong took 
advantage of the postwar chaos and the widespread resentment against 
what had become the corrupt and incompetent rule of the Kuomintang 
Government under Chiang Kai-check and established the People’s Republic 
of China in 1949. Foreigners left China and 2 million followers of the 
defeated Kuomintang fled to Taiwan. With that, Mao Zedong called the end 
of the ‘Century of Humiliation’ of foreign domination (Malkiel and Taylor, 
2008, p. 28). 
Under Mao Zedong’s leadership, China adopted a Soviet-style planned 
economy with rigid government control, and asked Russian experts to 
participate in China’s development. The adoption of Marxism, a European 
philosophy, and the invitation of Russian experts to help rebuild the country 
was a ironic contradiction to the rejection of foreign domination by the 20 
    
Communist Party of China. The economic progress that followed between 
1942 and 1952 was made possible because the country was so devastated 
by the civil war and the Japanese occupation that the repair of the 
infrastructure, the distribution of land from landlord to peasants, and the 
introduction of the Renminbi, a currency based on the traditional centuries-
old Yuan, generated considerable economic activity that fueled this 
progress. After obtaining stability by what was called systematical 
‘neatening’ of the country, the Communist Party of China began a series of 
Five-Year Plans, following the Soviet Marxist model. In the First (1953-
1957), all private owned establishments were taken over by the 
government, the whole economy was under direct control through state-
owned enterprises (SOEs), and agriculture-communes that farmers were 
forced to participate (Malkiel and Taylor, 2008, p. 29-30) . 
With the purpose to accelerate the economic development, Mao 
Zedong created a new system, that he called the ‘Great Leap Forward’. The 
new system was formalized in the Second Five-Year Plan (1958-1962), and 
called for the implementation of a variety of unproven and unrealistic 
techniques to boast agricultural and industrial production. The diversion of 
unskilled labor to industrial and infrastructure projects, the lack of personal 
incentives, and the appearance of regional draughts and floods let to sharp 
drop in grain production lead to a large famine, probably the largest such 
tragedy in Chinese history, with an estimated death of 20 to 30 million 
people. At the same time, profound divergence between the Russia led by 
Nikita Khrushchev (1894-1971) and China under Mao Zedong emerged and 
the Russian’s withdrew their experts and stopped the shipment of vital parts 
to the jointly developed factories. This left hundreds of large Chinese 
project in trouble and strengthened their distrust of foreigners (Malkiel and 
Taylor, 2008, p. 30-31). 
 
Cultural Revolution 
After what became known as the ‘Three Bitter Years’ of the ‘Great Leap 
Forward’ Mao Zedong was forced to take a more backseat role by the 
Politburo meeting in 1961. The Communist Party then made a pragmatic 21 
    
readjustment of the economy which lasted from 1961 to 1965. Mao Zedong 
was not happy with a secondary role, and in 1966 with the backing of the 
true believers in the purity of the communist revolution retook the 
leadership, developed the third Five-Year Plan (1966-1970) and started the 
‘Cultural Revolution’. These new initiatives of Mao Zedong created ten years 
of confusion and repression. In the ‘Great Leap Forward’ peasants were told 
to make steel, in the ‘Cultural Revolution’ skilled workers and the educated 
youth were sent to work in the fields. Moderate and pragmatic politicians 
were purged and exiled, among them Deng Xiaoping (1900-1996), who was 
sent to a tractor in rural Jiangxi Province (Malkiel and Taylor, 2008, p. 32). 
The Cultural Revolution was a catastrophic decade for China, the 
economy was in chaos, its cultural heritage was irreparable damaged, and 
the enrollment in colleges and universities was suspended and the existing 
students sent to work in the fields by the Red Guards under Mao Zedong’s 
sponsorship. With Mao Zedong’s death in September of 1976 the Central 
Committee Political Bureau of the Communist Party decided to end the 
‘Cultural Revolution’, and Deng Xiaoping became the new leader in China 
(Jin, 2003, p. 247 and 251). 
 
Deng Xiaoping and social-capitalism 
Deng Xiaoping demanded in May 1977 the eradication of past errors, 
in May 1978 the Party School of Central Committee issued the historical 
article ‘Practice is the sole criterion of testing the truth’, and in December of 
the same year the Third Plenum of the Eleventh National Party Congress 
Central Committee started the first step toward overall economic reform 
and opening-up to the world (Jin, 2003, p. 251). The irony is that the 
‘Cultural Revolution’ laid the basis for the success of Deng Xiaoping’s 
economic reforms. Things had gotten so bad under the radicals, that 
everyone wanted change. To this day, the generation that lived under Mao 
Zedong still has strong memories of the hunger they endured. 
In the first years of the economic liberalization, entrepreneurship 
flourished in China and corruption increased. Unemployment rose as 
inefficient state owned enterprises were forced to adapt to the new 22 
    
competitive environment. Students with their new freedom began protests 
for political reform. These protests culminated in the demonstration at the 
Tiananmen Square in Beijing in the summer of 1989. Den Xiaoping believing 
that an uncontrolled political reform, such as was being conducted in the 
Soviet Union, would be disastrous for China, decided to repress the 
demonstration. He was right because a year later the Soviet Union dissolved 
into many different states. At the same time the Communist Party hard-
liners felt that Den Xiaoping was to soft and progressive and in a fierce 
political in fights forced internal repression and economic retrenchment. 
Foreign investment stopped, and the economic activity was reduced 
sharply. 
In defiance of the hard-liners, Den Xiaoping in 1992, at the advanced 
age of 92 year, made the epic ‘Southern China Tour’ reminding people that 
the old days were not good, and that the conditions in the future should be 
much better. He advocated that the pace of the economic reform must be 
accelerated. During the trip he told people that: “To get rich is glorious!” 
The people responded with enthusiasm, and the hard-liners in Beijing could 
not ignore the message. With this trip, Den Xiaoping restarted China on its 
remarkable transformation to become the second largest economy in the 
World behind only the US, in GDP measured on purchasing power parity 
(PPP) basis. 
China’s opening of the economy incorporate the humiliating lessons of 
the past dealings with the West, and is being done under strict Chinese 
terms and conditions. China is determined to maintain its economic and 
diplomatic independence as it develops its unique model of social-
capitalism. This model so far has brought tremendous wealth and 
opportunity to its people. It is also clear that the economic reforms started 
by Den Xiaoping, is a unique experiment that still needs further refinement 
in the quest for China to return to its rightful position as one of the World’s 
leading nations. There are tremendous economic and social challenges and 
risks to be overcome in the future to reach this goal, particularly in 
improving the livelihood of the entire population of over 1.3 billion, and not 
only that of the privileged minority. 23 
    
The uniqueness of the Chinese social-capitalism economic model 
developed by Deng Xiaoping lies in the fact that it is not a marked 
economy, where prices and transactions are solely determined by individual 
consumers and producers, or a planned economy, where all prices and 
transactions are under government control. These two extremes are the 
capitalist and the socialist economic models. China is refining its particular 
social-capitalist economic model in the middle of these two extremes, with a 
mixture of state-owned and private-owned enterprises under a complex 
bureaucratic government structure. Another extraordinary insight by Den 
Xiaoping clearly stated in his historical ‘Southern China Tour’ of 1992 with 
the now anthological phrase: “To get rich is glorious”, is the need to 
promote and support entrepreneurship to fuel economic growth and 
progress. He echoed in his way Schumpeter’s (Schumpeter, 1942) thesis 
that without entrepreneurs acting as ‘agents of creative destruction’ there is 
no real economic growth and progress, and that the pure socials model was 
doomed because it did not promote entrepreneurship. 
 
China’s future challenges 
To evaluate the future challenges and risks to China’s unprecedented 
economic growth over the past three decades we have to understand the 
key factors responsible for this extraordinary accomplishment. The study 
China: The Balance Sheet (2006) conducted by C. Fred Bergsten and his 
colleagues under the auspice of the Center for Strategic and International 
Studies and the Institute for International Economics (cited by Malkiel and 
Taylor, 2008, p. 47) pointed to five factors as key to China’s stunning 
transformation: “The embrace of marked forces, the opening of the 
economy to trade and inward direct investment, high level of savings and 
investments, the structural transformation of the labor force, and 
investment in primary school education.” Of these key factors that 
promoted China’s growth, none is really at risk if the Chinese government 
does not deviate from its present economic policy and keeps up its 
refinement of its unique social-capitalist model. The real risks to China’s 
future growth are the remaining poverty, the unbalanced and unsustainable 24 
    
growth model, and the bureaucracy and corruption of government officials. 
These three major risks to China’s future will be examined in sequence. 
 
China’s remaining poverty may lead to unrest 
Since Den Xiaoping started the economic reforms in 1978 more than 
600 million Chinese have been lifted out of poverty, an extraordinary 
achievement. The living conditions of the people have been dramatically 
improved over these years, with income levels growing steadily at a fast 
pace. Between 1978 and 2007, urban disposable income per capita 
increased from 343.4 Yuan to 13,785.8 Yuan, while rural incomes grew 
from 133.6 Yuan to 4,140.4 Yuan—a more than six-fold increase in both 
even after adjustment for inflation. The share of food in spending for urban 
and rural residents fell from 57.5 percent to 36.3 percent and from 67.7 
percent to 43.1 percent, respectively, between 1978 and 2007. The 
emphasis in overall spending has shifted from a focus on basic needs such 
as food and clothing, to more diverse consumption patterns including 
housing, travel, education, culture, health, and so on. The rate of extreme 
poverty in rural areas has fallen from 250 million to 14.79 million people, 
while public goods and services such as universal primary education, public 
and basic health care, cultural facilities, etc. have been greatly expanded 
(United Nations in China, 2008, p. 9). 
Unfortunately not all are equally benefiting from this extraordinary 
progress, and China’s income inequality is widening. The per capita income 
ratio between urban and rural residents dropped from 2.6:1 in 1978 to 
1.9:1 in 1985 first, then rose to 3.3:1 in 2007. China’s income inequality is 
now the second highest in Asia, and is reaching levels that pose risks for the 
sustainability of future development. Such gaps are particularly critical in 
view of the increasing burden placed on individuals in paying for things such 
as health care and higher education, implying that income inequalities lead 
to disparities in access to key public services (United Nations in China, 
2008, p. 13-14). The Chinese income inequality, on the other hand is still 
low compared with Latin America where it has created strong political 25 
    
instabilities in Venezuela, Ecuador and Bolivia, and is threatening other 
countries. 
The rise of inequality is the natural result of the market forces that 
have generated China’s strong growth. Arthur Levis (1954), the first black 
to win the Nobel Prize in Economics, noted that: “Development must be 
inegalitarian because it does not start in every part of the economy at the 
same time.”  The reason, according to the Levis model (1954, p. 140-141), 
is the dualism of the labor market. One group, the modern, industrial, 
capitalist, formal or urban, can capture the full benefits of the economic 
development; and the other, the subsistence, informal, traditional, 
agricultural, or rural, will benefit less from this development. This is exactly 
what happened in China. Prior to Deng Xiaoping’s reform of 1978, there was 
almost no financial reward for education, and in most cases taxi drivers 
made more money than university professor’s. This changed dramatically 
with the economic reforms. The financial rewards for education rose 
dramatically, leaving the uneducated, and specially the rural population 
behind. This trend can obviously be reversed if the whole population has 
reasonable access to education. 
With wider access to education, a greater share of the population gets 
educated, and inequality will tend to be reduced over time. In practice, this 
simple solution is very difficult to implement in developing countries and 
particularly in China with an enormous rural population of 55 percent of its 
total population of 1.3 billion. In comparison the rural population of Brazil is 
only 17 percent, and the rural population of the US and Japan are 21 
percent (China Economic Review, 2009). 
The better access to education and the wage gap between the 
privileged urban population and the rural population has driven a high 
volume of rural-urban migration as can be attested by the rapid growth of 
the Chinese cities. In the pre-reform China a system existed that completely 
restricted the mobility of the population. This system still exists today and 
nobody can move from one location to another without receiving permission 
from the receiving community. This system has avoided the creation of 
slums around the Chinese cities like the ones that sprung up around most 26 
    
Latin America cities, but also denied to a large portion of the population the 
access to upward mobility. This barrier to upward mobility for the 
underprivileged rural people are the consequence of the usual practice for 
city officials to give access to migrants from the countryside that are skilled 
or that have money to buy this access. 
Reversing this widening income gaps and so avoids political unrest of 
the underprivileged, especially from the rural areas, is difficult, and is one of 
major challenges for the Chinese Government in the coming years. In the 
last years there has been an increasing grumbling among those left out of 
the current economic boom, as attested by the frequent headlines about 
police cracking down on protestors in Chinese villages. These unrest, 
however are very different from those in Latin America, were anger is 
directed against free market economies and foreign investments. In China 
people appear to be fully convinced of Deng Xiaoping’s assertion: “To be 
rich is glorious!” The Chinese seem to want education, and their share of 
the country’s growing wealth generated by the free market economy. 
The Chinese government is well aware of the problem, has been 
promoting the growth of the economy at a very fast pace, with the purpose 
of spreading wealth to a continuous growing share of the population, and so 
avoid political unrest. The economic crisis of 2008 and 2009 represents a 
risk to the Chinese economic growth solution to maintain political stability. 
The crisis also created the additional risk of unrest in the cities, as 
consequence of the rising urban unemployment, particularly of the large 
contingent of students that are leaving the universities and are not finding 
adequate jobs, this year alone, more than 6 million new graduates are 
entering the employment market (The Economist, April 11
th 2009, p. 40). 
 
China’s unbalanced and unsustainable growth 
The extraordinary growth of the Chinese economy was based on three 
economic drivers: Net exports; domestic consumption; and public and 
private capital investments. In 2007 net export contributed 21.5 percent to 
GDP growth; domestic consumption contributed 39.7 percent; and gross 
capital formation 38.8 percent according to the preliminary numbers from 27 
    
The National Bureau of Statistics of China (People Bank of China, Annual 
Report 2007, p. 18).The two drivers, exports and capital investments, 
cannot continue to grow at the historical rates. China’s reliance on exports 
to fuel growth has become unsustainable because of the 2008 and 2009 
worldwide economic crisis, particularly with regards to trade imbalance with 
the US, and the enormous ever-growing-trade deficit accumulated by this 
country. This trade imbalance will certainly not be politically acceptable in 
the future by the US Congress; rising protectionist sentiment may lead to 
legislation restricting China’s exports to the US, and thus affect negatively 
China’s future GNP growth. Foreign capital investment in China that, 
generates GNP growth, will almost certainly also decline in the future. The 
overinvestment in public and private Chinese enterprises will inevitably 
leads to diminishing returns of the invested capitals, and the consequent 
disinterest of domestic and international investors. 
The Chinese Government knows that they must change emphasis on 
the growth drivers of the GDP if they want to continue growing at a similar 
pace as they did over the last thirty years. They cannot longer rely on 
exports and foreign capital investments to the same degree as they did in 
the past. There is also the problem of the huge increase in global current 
account imbalance, with the consequent emergence of huge surpluses in 
emerging economies, led above all by China. The debtor countries, 
particularly the US, have to stabilize their economies. They cannot continue 
with an indefinitive rise in government debt or profligate private borrowing. 
If they continue increasing debt this will inevitably led to defaults. Their only 
alternative is for debtors to earn their way out with a big rise in net exports. 
This means that China must expand strongly demand for imports relative to 
supplying exports (Wolf, Financial Times, June 9 2009). Economists believe 
that such shifts in the growth drivers are both feasible and likely as 
domestic income rises. 
The consumer spending in China today is around 40 percent of GDP 
versus 70 percent in the US. Even while maintaining a high savings rate, 
the Chinese can increase substantially their consumption (Malkiel and 
Taylor, 2008, p. 86). This consumption growth will be pushed by the 
younger generation, the ‘young emperor generation’, also called the ‘me 28 
    
generation’. This generation born after the market reform started in 1978, 
and after the ‘one child’ policy was introduced in 1979, grew up spoiled by 
their parents, that doted on their single child, assisted enthusiastically by 
the grandparents. They are self-centered, frequently self-indulgent, and the 
most avid and savvy consumers. These young yuppies are driving the 
demand in China, buying everything from expensive watches to imported 
cars (Degen, 2009, p. 1 and 6). 
There is the possibility for China to continue growing the economy for 
a while longer with substantial investment in infrastructure. There are still 
large investments required for the development of the western region of the 
country. The vast investments made in the last 30 years in infrastructure to 
develop the country are credited with allowing China to grow at a much 
faster pace than India. 
 
China’s bureaucracy and corruption 
Corruption of officials that profit personally from public office exists all 
over the world in some degree or other, and Transparency International 
(TI), a nonprofit organization uses surveys the world’s countries on their 
perceived level of corruption. Based on the surveys they rank the countries 
in terms of the degree to which corruption is perceived to exist among 
public officials and politicians. The scores range from zero for highly corrupt 
countries to ten for highly clean ones. Of the 180 countries surveyed by TI 
in 2008, China was rated as 72
nd with a score of 3.6, at the same level as 
Bulgaria, Macedonia, Mexico, Peru, Suriname, Swaziland, and Trinidad and 
Tobago. While China is not among the worst countries, the low rating 
reflects the fact that it has a serious problem of corruption. Gregory Chow 
(2005, p. 4), the noted China Scholar from Princeton University, wrote: 
“The major factor that will hinder further economic reform in China, in my 
opinion, is the bureaucratic behavior and corruption of government officials. 
I can easily predict that further reform is gradual and slow, as in the past, 
mainly because there is inertia due to vested interests of the bureaucracy 
and because culture is difficult and slow to change.” 29 
    
China’s corruption problems have attracted worldwide attention in the 
last 30 years, because the economic reforms introduced by Deng Xiaoping 
in 1978, that generated the extraordinary economic growth and wealth of 
today’s China, became tainted with it. But corruption is not new in China, as 
attested by the constantly staged uprisings against the corruption of the 
Imperial Qing Court, and was even encouraged by the British during the 
‘Century of Humiliation’ to promote the extraordinary lucrative opium trade. 
The economic reforms and the fast growth have created new opportunities 
and much higher incentives, for illicit connections between wealth and 
power, according to Johnston (2001, p. 1). 
Farhoomand and Woo (2006, p. 6-15) explain that corruption is an 
extremely complex social behavior, and identify six key forms of corruption 
in China: 
1.  Government or insider control of corporate mechanisms 
encourages power manipulation within and outside the 
organizations. Managers who belong to a government or insider 
network, and are rewarded with an appointment by the network, 
may seek ways to line their pockets by using their positions to 
support the network that appointed them, and for personal gain. 
This way internal corrupt power networks are formed in a short 
period of time, mainly in state owned enterprises (SOEs), but also 
in some private corporations where controls are lax. 
2.  Non alignment of the personal interest of managers with 
that of the shareholders of companies. Managers advance their 
personal profits or interests at the expenses of the shareholders of 
the companies. This form of corruption may occur in many forms, 
including the ‘moral hazard’ of western financial managers that 
generated the 2008 world crisis.  
3.  The under-developed legal system leads to ambiguity to 
what commercial bribery is increasing opportunities for 
corruption. Giving potential customer’s kickbacks, including cash 
and luxuries, are a long-standing practice of doing business in 30 
    
China, and it is difficult to distinguish whether they are bribes or 
legitimate commissions. 
4.  Government officials in order to secure their social status 
and not to be left out of the money-generating opportunities 
created by the economic reform build corrupt relationships 
with businessmen. Government officials create bureaucratic 
difficulties to sell facilities to their cronies. Besides taking bribes, 
extorting money or requesting kickbacks, they are able to profit 
directly by investing in the stock market or in real estate through 
personal connections, creating policies, and using privileged 
information. 
5.  Abuse of the ‘guanxi’ network. In the Chinese business world 
‘guanxi’ is understood as the network of relationships among 
various individuals that cooperates together and support one 
another. The concept is very much one of “You scratch my back, I’ll 
scratch yours.” In essence, it means exchanging favors, which are 
expected to be done regularly and voluntarily. Businessmen in 
China know that maintaining guanxi with government officials is 
important, as they have decisive or influential powers to authorize 
projects, issue trading licenses, approve loans and obtain listing for 
companies. For this reason, in many cases become synonym for 
corruption and other wrongdoings like nepotism, bribery and fraud, 
and may be hard to distinguish from normal relationship marketing. 
6.  Lack of basic social values. The long history corruption of the 
Imperial Qing Court, the foreign invasion, corruption and 
exploitation during the ‘Century of Humiliation , the disaster of Mao 
Zedong’s ’Great Leap Forward’, the repression of the ‘Cultural 
Revolution’, and Deng Xiaoping’s words “To get rich is glorious” 
spread out as a popular reform slogan all over the country. All these 
negative influences and Deng Xiaoping’s slogan motivated the 
people to forget Confucius teachings, and work for self-enrichment 
instead of working for the common good of the country and its 
population. 31 
    
Paradoxically, writes Johnston (2001, p.7), these forms of corruption 
may also have helped overcome some of the conflicts between state power, 
represented by its bureaucrats, and the forces promoting the economic 
reforms, represented by the fast emerging entrepreneurs. Corruption 
served as a kind of lubricant that motivated government bureaucrats to 
modify and adapt government policies that would have hindered the 
economic reforms by giving them extremely attractive opportunities for 
collusion with the entrepreneurs that promoted China’s extraordinary 
growth. 
Corruption may have helped lubricate the economic reforms but over 
the longer term it has potentially explosive consequences for China’s 
economic and political future, as Johnston (2001, p. 8) and Minxin (2007, p. 
1) points out. Illicit practices such as bribery, kickbacks, theft, and 
misspending of public money cost at least 3 percent of GDP, according to 
Minxin (2007, p. 1). It is also undermining the legitimacy of the ruling 
Chinese Communist Party, widening income inequalities between those that 
are benefiting from the economic reforms and those that are being 
marginalized, and so fueling social unrest by inciting popular resentment 
against the highly-visible new rich class of profiting bureaucrats and 
entrepreneurs. 
The problem of defusing the potential negative economic and political 
consequences of corruption is not unique to China. Unfortunately, 
corruption is a common problem to all the new emerging economical powers 
known as BRIC (Brazil, Russia, India and China). The solution for these 
countries is a systematic and focused effort to promote transparency in the 
political processes and government bureaucracies. Growing transparency in 
politics and government is the only way to systematically reduce incentives 
and opportunities for corruption. The required changes are not easy to 
promote, because of the many conflicting interests, particularly from those 
benefiting from the murky situation. Historically the process of promoting 
transparency has been long and difficult, and frequently motivated by 
considerable political unrests and conflicts, as is seen in some countries in 
Eastern Europe, Latin America, Asia and Africa. 32 
    
China wants to show the world that it is recuperating its past greatness 
and sophistication, and that the ‘Century of Humiliation”, ‘Three Bitter 
Years’, and the “Cultural Revolution’ are things of the past.  It already has 
demonstrated its future grandeur by successfully sponsoring the 2008 
Olympics in Beijing and will continue by sponsoring the 2010 World Expo in 
Shanghai. China possesses a government that can carry out whatever it 
deems necessary to realize its goals. 
China’s government is taking determined steps to alleviate 
environmental degradation, income inequality, and is encouraging the 
transition from an economy dependent on exports to one where internal 
consumers play a much larger role. The same determination has been 
shown in raining in corruption, as demonstrated by the many crackdowns 
on corrupt government officials. The Chinese know that if they don’t control 
corruption, the governing Communist Party will lose its control over the 
country as did in the past the Imperial Qing Court, and the Kuomintang 
government of Chiang Kai-shek. For these reasons, we believe that the risks 
exist and are a real treats to China’s future, but can be overcome by the 
pragmatic and determined Chinese government. The Chinese approach to 
political and economic development has been, and will probably continue 
being one of trial and error. Government officials describe this trial and 
error process as being similar to “crossing a river by feeling the stones 
underneath.” 
Now having covered China’s history, its stunning growth, and the 
future challenges to this growth, we will review how these factors influence 
the opportunities and risk of its unique stock market and other investments. 
 
China’s opportunities and risks 
The availability of capital resources is fundamental for any economy to 
sustain real economic growth. Without sufficient capital, enterprises capable 
of increasing production and productivity will be curtailed, and the economic 
growth rate will be reduced. The abundance of capital and the speed of the 
allocation process are essential for the development of the economic 
production process of a country and its long-run rate of growth. A well-33 
    
functioning stock market plays this critical role, supplying and allocating the 
needed capital to enterprises, in the required speed for them to grow, and 
so sustain the real economic growth of the country. The stock market has 
three fundamental roles: Providing an outlet for individual saving; supplying 
these savings in form of equity to enterprises to fuel their expansions; and 
signaling managers the cost of capital, and direction of future investments 
in their pursuit of the best returns for the invested capital. 
 
China’s unique stock market 
The Chinese recognized early that Deng Xiaoping’s reforms alone could 
not sustain economic growth. To sustain growth capital investments were 
required, and a process had to be established to ensure that needed capital 
could be provided. The government started by permitting the issuance of 
shares in an attempt to get capital for rural enterprises in 1979, followed in 
1982 with the establishment of the Shenzhen Special Economic Zone for 
shareholding companies, in 1986 with the first security exchange in 
Shenyang, in 1990 with the Shenzhen and the Shanghai stock exchanges, 
and in 1991 with the National Electronic Trading System (NETS). In 1992 
Deng Xiaoping undertakes his ‘Southern China Tour’, and affirms that China 
can try out stock markets. This comment started an intense sequence of 
activities. In 1993 state-owned enterprises (SOEs) adopt new accounting 
principles based on International Accounting Standards, and the 
government initiated a stream of measures to improve transparency and 
governance of the listed companies and suppress stock manipulation by 
investors (Walter and Howie, 2006, p. XVII-XXXX). 
The China Securities Regulatory Commission (CSRC) is the chief 
regulatory body that oversees the Chinese stock market. Besides the role of 
regulating trading, the CSRS helps to determine the quotas given to foreign 
investors that permit them to buy limited amounts of local Chinese shares 
(Malkiel and Taylor, 2008, p. 110-111). This because a distinctive feature of 
the stock market is its confusing literal alphabet soup of share designations 
that indicate where the shares are traded and who can buy them. If this is 
not enough there are tradable and non tradable shares. The tradable can be 34 
    
purchased by private investors, and non-tradable controlled by the state or 
governments agencies. The non-tradable shares were created to ensure 
that the state retains control of the SOEs. The Chinese stock market is the 
only stock market in the world in which the majority of the listed companies 
are SOEs. 
The existence of the state-owned shares created two significant risks 
that have concerned investors. The first is the risk of managers of the SOEs 
making decisions that interest government, and eventually may go against 
the best interest of the private shareholders. The second is the risk that the 
state makes its share in a SOE tradable, and so by increasing suddenly the 
supply reduces the value of the shares held by private shareholders. 
The shares listed and trading in the Chinese stock exchanges are 
described below in alphabetical order (Malkiel and Taylor, 2008, p. 115-
119): 
A shares – Available to local investors. This is the predominant class of 
shares held by the Chinese public, are traded in yuan, and represents 
approximately 30 percent of the total shares traded in China. The 
investors in A shares in China are predominantly individual rather than 
institutions. This contrasts with the United States were over 70 percent 
of stock ownership is held by institutional investors. Originally only 
Chinese nationals were allowed to own this type of shares, but under 
the Qualified Foreign Investors Program, initiated in 2002, a limited 
number of foreign institutional investors are permitted participate, 
theses permits are for determined quota of A shares, and are renewed 
annually. There are also limits of A shares these foreign investors may 
acquire in a single company, and there are also restrictions on the 
repatriation of the invested funds; 
 
B shares – Available to foreign investors. These shares are traded in 
Hong Kong dollars on the Shenzhen exchange, and in U.S. dollars on 
the Shanghai exchange. The Chinese Government is considering the 
termination of trading in the B shares market because the problem 
created of the A and B shares of the same company typically trade at 35 
    
different prices. The different prices are the consequence of arbitrage 
trading between the two types of shares not being possible. There is no 
arbitrage trading because Chinese mainland nationals have no access 
to B shares and foreigners have only a very limited access to A shares. 
Besides this the number of B shares is small and consequently 
practically illiquid; 
 
H shares – Available to Hong Kong investors. The lack of interest of 
foreign investors in B shares let the government to establish in 1993 
the H shares. These shares are from Chinese mainland companies that 
are listed on the Hong Kong Stock Exchange, and are traded in Hong 
Kong dollars. The Chinese government approval is required for a SOE 
to list its shares internationally, and in general the companies 
approved to be listed on the Hong Kong exchange are the showcase 
companies in China. Because the Chinese residents cannot freely 
convert yuan to Hong Kong dollars, they are practically excluded from 
investing in China’s largest and most profitable companies. To solve 
this problem the government gave permission to major companies to 
list on the mainland, as well as on the international stock exchanges. 
This created the so-called ‘Red Chip’ shares in Hong Kong, that are the 
shares of Hong Kong listed companies that have a Chinese mainland 
shareholder holding of at least 35 percent of total shares. This 
arrangement permitted that non-listed Chinese companies purchase 
dormant Hong Kong listed shell companies, insert mainland assets into 
the Hong Kong ‘Red Chip’ shares companies, transform these 
companies into the holding companies, through a so-called ‘reverse 
takeover’. These holding companies with access to international  
financing, in turn can be used to acquire more Chinese assets. Gome, 
the dominant home electric appliance retailer in China, did exactly this 
to go public and finance its extraordinary growth (Jin, Liao, Guo & Zhu, 
2007); 
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N shares – Chinese Shares traded in the United States.  The Chinese 
government chose some of the best performing Chinese companies to 
be listed on the New York Stock Exchange, and in the case of high-tech 
companies on the NASDAQ. The designation N shares is a reference to 
the first initials of these two stock exchanges. These shares are 
generally traded as American Depository Receipts (ADRs), which 
means that trade takes place in U.S. dollars, and dividends are also 
paid in this currency; 
 
L shares – Chinese shares traded on the London Stock Exchange; 
 
T shares – Chinese shares traded on the Tokyo Stock Exchange; and 
 
S shares – Chinese shares traded on the Singapore Stock Exchange. 
As mentioned before the same company can be listed with more than 
one type of shares, and because arbitrage is restricted, these shares 
may be traded at different prices in the local and international markets. 
 
Efficiency of the Chinese stock market 
The term efficiency is used in two contexts; the first is operational or 
internal efficiency, and the second is the pricing or external efficiency of the 
stock market. In an operational efficient stock market, investors can obtain 
information and transaction services as cheaply as possible. On the other 
hand, pricing efficiency refers to a market where prices at all times fully 
reflect all available information that is ‘relevant’ to the valuation of shares, 
that reflects the expected return from holding the shares. The expected 
return over some holding period is equal to expected cash distribution plus 
the expected price change, all divided by the initial price. 
Fama (1970, p.383-417) classified the pricing efficiency of a stock 
market into three categories: weak, semi-strong, and strong, based on the 
hypothesized ‘relevant’ information that prices of the shares should reflect: 37 
    
A weak efficient market means that the prices of the shares reflect past 
prices and trading history of the shares; a semi-strong efficient market 
means that the price of the shares fully reflect all public information, which 
includes but is not limited to historical prices and trading patterns; and a 
strong efficient market means that the prices of the shares reflect all 
information, whether or not it is publicly available. 
The classification of the pricing market efficiency carries strong 
implications for the investment strategy that investors may wish to pursue. 
These investment strategies may vary from simply buying and holding 
shares in weak pricing efficient market, where share prices can be predicted 
based on past historical prices and trading patterns; to a strategy of 
indexing, which simply seeks to match the performance of some financial 
index in a strong pricing efficient market, where share prices cannot be 
predicted on the basis of past historical prices and trading patterns. The fast 
growth and popularity of exchange-trade funds (ETFs) that trade on a stock 
exchange follow the indexing investment strategy, is proof that this strategy 
is profitable, and is preferred by investors that want to avoid the perils of 
choosing individual shares. The semi-strong pricing efficient market where 
share prices can be predicted based on past history and trading patterns, 
but these predictions may be adjusted by some new public information, 
allows for professionals investors, insiders, and information manipulators to 
develop strategies to beat the market. 
According to Burton and Taylor (2008, p. 132-133) the Chinese A 
shares market often fails the test of weak price efficiency, and so probably 
is a semi-strong price efficient market where professionals, insiders, and 
information manipulators can use trading strategies to beat the market. 
They also found that the H shares market has been a weak efficient market 
in the past, and that there are indications that he is reasonably strong 
efficient at present time. Burton and Taylor (2008, p. 147) conclude their 
evaluation of the Chinese stock market with the following conclusion: 
Though manipulation and fraud have been rampart in stocks listed on 
the Chinese markets, there is now a concerned government-backed 
effort to change that situation. Still, local Chinese investors would do 38 
    
well to seek and follow the professional investment advice of local firms 
with proven track records. Those outside China who wish to invest 
directly in the booming economy will find that Chinese shares listed on 
foreign markets are reasonably efficiently priced and can easily be 
acquired through exchange-trade funds. 
They conclude (2008, p. 177-178) by pointing out that China will likely 
be the fastest growing economy in the world over the next two decades, 
that before the present financial crisis the Chinese stocks traded in 
international markets appeared to be moderately priced relative to other 
equities around the world, and at this moment investors could reasonably 
anticipate long-run double-digit returns by purchasing them. This 
assessment made by these authors in July 2007 is probably outdated by the 
world financial crisis, but the basic facts are still valid. 
 
China’s investment strategies 
China is the investment place to be, and those that invest now in the 
fast growing economy will certainly be generously rewarded in the future. 
To buy individual Chinese stocks the investor must be very familiar with the 
risk associated with the target company. This is difficult because reliable 
information on the companies is hard to get by somebody living outside 




Burton and Taylor (2008, p. 206) recommend that most investors will 
be better off participating in Chinese investments through mutual funds. 
These funds package together a portfolio of stocks and then sell shares that 
represent interests in that portfolio. An important distinction between then 
concerns whether they are ‘open-end’ or ‘close-end’ funds. 
The ‘open-end’ funds are, as the name implies, open to grow the 
number of shares. When more money comes in, the manager’s use the 
funds to buy more shares and thus create more shares in the fund. These 39 
    
funds are not traded on stock exchanges, and the purchase and redemption 
of shares are all handled directly by the sponsoring company. On the other 
hand, ‘closed-end’ funds are listed on exchanges and are bought and sold 
like any other stock. The manager of the fund can trade shares within the 
fund, but usually, as the name closed implies, does not issue new shares 
after the initial offering. The shares of ‘open-end’ funds are priced at net 
asset value, while the price of ‘closed-end’ funds depends on what other 
investors are willing to pay for them. These funds come in all sizes and 
shapes. Some are geographical mutual funds that include those dedicated 
solely to China. 
Burton and Taylor (2008, p. 208) warn that most mutual funds are 
created for the benefit of the sponsoring companies and not for the 
inventors in the fund. The sponsoring companies have made a lot of money 
from their funds, so much that many have gone public and sold shares in 
their operations. ‘Open-end’ mutual fund manager make money by charging 
their investors in three ways: charging a fee to participate known as a ‘load 
fee’, charging annual management and transaction fees, and charging a 
percentage on the profits of the mutual funds as incentive for managing it. 
Because researching Chinese stocks poses particular challenges, and 
making transactions in small Chinese companies is far more difficult than 
shares of United States companies, the fees for emerging market mutual 
funds tend to be higher than for United States domestic funds. 
 
Index and exchange-trade funds 
Index funds are ‘open-end’ mutual funds that usually have relative low 
fees. This because once a financial index is selected for the fund such as the 
Standard & Poor’s Index of 500 Stocks and a portfolio of shares in that 
index  is put together there further management involvement required as 
far as stock selection goes. Exchange-trade funds are ‘closed-end’ mutual 
funds. Their fees are similar to the index funds for the same reasons. These 
funds like the ordinary mutual funds they cover a range of areas, including 
single countries like China. 40 
    
Index investing is a passive, low-cost method of profiting from strong 
price efficient stock market. In the case of China the A share market is yet 
to behave with strong price efficiency, and behaves more like a semi-strong 
price market with all the implications explained before. This means that the 
Chinese A shares market is not yet adequate, and so recommended for 
index investing. However, the Chinese H shares market in Hong Kong and 
the N shares market in New York are reasonably strong price efficient, and 
so are adequate and recommended for index investing, either through 
mutual funds or exchange-trade funds. Investing in these funds is a 
reasonable low-cost diversified investment strategy for investor to access 
the stocks of Chinese companies traded in the world markets. 
 There are today several indexes of listed stocks in Hong Kong and in 
New York that can be followed by funds investing in Chinese stocks. These 
indexes are: 
Hang Seng Index. This index is the benchmark of the Hong Kong 
Stock Exchange Market. The Hang Seng Index is one of the best-
known indexes in Asia, and is widely used by Chinese fund managers 
as their performance benchmark, much the same way as the 
Standard & Poor’s Stock Index is used by U.S. fund managers. The 
index is based on the stock of forty companies that account for about 
two thirds of the total market capitalization of all stocks listed on the 
Hong Kong exchange; 
 
MSCI Hong Kong Index. This index is an index created by Morgan 
Stanley Capital International Inc. (MSCI) is based on most of the 
stocks traded on the Hong Kong exchange. This index is the basis for 
some important U.S. mutual funds. 
 
FISE/Xinhua China 25 Index. This index was created by FTSE/Xinhua 
Ltd. This firm is a joint venture between FTSE, owned jointly by the 
Financial Times and the London Stock Exchange, and Xinhua Finance 
Ltd., a Hong Kong based financial services and media company. The 
FISE/Xinhua 25 Index is the most widely known and used index of 41 
    
the joint venture and is based on the twenty-five largest and most 
liquid Chinese stocks traded on the Hong Kong exchange. Another 
index of the joint venture is the FTSE/Xinhua Hong Kong Index that 
serves as benchmark for China’s Social Security Fund. 
 
Halter USX China. This index is based on all Chinese stocks traded in 
the United States, including some very small and dubious ones. This 
index is the basis of the PGJ exchange-trade fund. 
 
BMI China Index. This index created by Standard & Poor’s and 
Citigroup Global Markets is based on over one hundred Chinese 
stocks traded on either the U.S. stock exchanges or the Hong Kong 
Stock Exchange, or both. This index is the basis for the GXC 
exchange trade fund. 
 
NASDAQ China Index. This index is the equivalent of the FTSE/Xinhua 
China 25 Index based on the mainland Chinese stocks that are traded 
as ADRs in the United States. 
Exchange-trade funds based on these indexes have proven to be low-
cost and popular vehicles for investing in Chinese stocks. Burton and Taylor 
(2008, p. 212) point out that ETFs dedicated to China represent a very 
attractive investment, and present four China-centered funds that trade on 
U.S. exchanges (2008, p. 234-240) – EWH ETF (iShares MSCI-Hong Kong 
Index Fund), FXI ETF (iShares FTSE/Xinhua China 25 Index Exchange Trade 
Fund), PGJ ETF (Power-Shares Golden Dragon Halter USX China), and GXC 
ETF (SDPR S&P China ETF). 
 
Funds moderate the risk of buying individual stocks 
The main reason that investing in mutual funds is less risky that direct 
investment in individual stocks, besides the risk diversification these funds 
provide, the low operational efficiency of the Chinese stock markets, that 42 
    
make it very difficult to get good and reliable information on listed 
companies. Besides this the accounting statements in China are still 
relatively opaque and the corporate governance of Chinese companies is not 
yet up to world standards as can be attested by the research and evaluation 
conducted by Li (2008, p. 162) that concluded: “The general status of 
Chinese companies’ top management governance is relatively bad.”  Peng 
(2008, p. 25) goes even further and writhes: “The current situation in 
Chinese corporate governance has caused the lack of even a basic balance 
in Chinese enterprise. Without such checks and balances these companies 
can do whatever they want in the market without any restrictions. The 
interest not only of related parties but also of their investors, such as 
minority shareholders, cannot be protected.” 
 
Optimal investment strategy in Chinese stocks 
Investing in Chinese stocks is finding the right way of profiting from 
China’s expected exceptional and unique future growth in the twenty-first 
century, and at the same time avoiding the risks represented by corruption, 
murky corporate financial statements, shady corporate governance, and 
complicated opaque government bureaucracy. With such risks it is not 
surprising that the Chinese stock markets are extremely volatile. For this 
reason many believe that investing in China is like buying a lottery ticket. 
You may win a lot of money but the chances are against you. 
The fact that investing in China stocks is risky does not mean that 
investors cannot profit from it. Every investor knows that profits are in most 
cases directly correlated to risks. Higher profits come with higher risks and 
lower profits with lower risks. The only way to handle risks is by careful 
evaluating their probability and consequences, developing a strategy to 
manage them, and minimize their negative impact if by chance they occur. 
Burton and Taylor (2008, p. 282-284) three general rules to minimize the 
risks of investing in Chinese stocks: 
1.  Diversify broadly by investing in funds rather than in individual 
stocks. 43 
    
2.  Invest gradually over time, so to lessen the risk of investing in a 
speculative peak. 
3.  Be aware of the costs that funds charge, invest in low cost funds, 
so to maximize your net investment return. 
Exchange-trade funds are attractive because besides being diversified, 
they have particularly low management fees. The best way to buy shares in 
these funds is through discount brokers. Every fee or charge that can be 
saved or keep to a minimum means a higher return on the investment. 
 
Summing up 
The unique social-capitalism economic model developed by Deng 
Xiaoping, particularly the liberalization and promotion of the Chinese 
entrepreneurs, was extraordinary successful in transforming China from an 
economical and technological backward nation into one of the world’s most 
dynamic nations. There are challenges and risks for China to continue its 
unprecedented economic growth of the last three decades. The key factors 
that promoted China’s growth are not at risk if the Chinese government 
does not deviate from its present economic policy and keeps up refining its 
unique social-capitalist model. The real risk to China’s future are the 
remaining poverty, the unbalanced and unsustainable growth model, and 
the bureaucracy and corruption of government officials. China’s government 
is well aware of these risks; is taking determined steps to alleviate 
environmental degradation, and income inequality; is trying hard to rain in 
corruption, simplify bureaucracy, and make it more transparent; and is also 
encouraging the transition from export dependent economy to one where 
internal consumers play a much larger role. For this reason, we believe that 
the challenges and risks exists and are real treats to China’s future, but can 
be overcome by pragmatic and determined Chinese government. 
The Chinese stock market provides the best opportunity for investors 
to profit from the transformation of China into the economic miracle of the 
twenty-first century. Since the strongest and most profitable Chinese 
companies stocks trade in the international exchanges, foreign mutual funds 
have broad opportunities to purchase attractive portfolios. For this reason 44 
    
they provide an attractive vehicle for investors to profit from investing in 
Chinese stocks avoiding the substantial risk of investing in individual stocks. 
Funds offer broad diversification and easy one stop shopping, in many cases 
through the internet. In general they sell at price-earnings multiples in line 
with those on world equity markets, but have considerably better long-run 
growth prospects. Exchange-trade funds are particularly attractive because 
of the lower costs and consequently higher returns for investors. 
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